HITRUST CSF requirement statement [?] (07.10mAISecOrganizational.2)
To help ensure that unsafe assets are not introduced into the AI system, the
organization checks the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI
(1) models;
(2) software packages (e.g., those for model creation, training, and/or deployment);
(3) datasets (e.g., training datasets); and
(4) language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins)
before use, as applicable.
- Evaluative elements in this requirement statement [?]
-
1. To help ensure that unsafe assets are not introduced into the AI system, the organization checks the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI models before use, if applicable.
2. To help ensure that unsafe assets are not introduced into the AI system, the organization checks the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI software packages (e.g., those used for model creation, training, and/or deployment) before use, if applicable.
3. To help ensure that unsafe assets are not introduced into the AI system, the organization checks the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI datasets (e.g., training datasets) before use, if applicable.
4. To help ensure that unsafe assets are not introduced into the AI system, the organization checks the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins) before use, if applicable.
- Illustrative procedures for use during assessments [?]
- Policy: Examine policies related to each evaluative element within the requirement statement. Validate the existence of a written or undocumented policy as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric.
- Procedure: Examine evidence that written or undocumented procedures exist as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric. Determine if the procedures and address the operational aspects of how to perform each evaluative element within the requirement statement.
- Implemented: Examine evidence that all evaluative elements within the requirement statement have been implemented as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric, using a sample based test where possible for each evaluative element. Example test(s):
- For example, review the AI system to ensure the organization verifies the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI models, software packages (e.g., those for model creation, training, and/or deployment), datasets (e.g., training datasets), and language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins) before use, as applicable.
- For example, review the AI system to ensure the organization verifies the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI models, software packages (e.g., those for model creation, training, and/or deployment), datasets (e.g., training datasets), and language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins) before use, as applicable.
- Measured: Examine measurements that formally evaluate and communicate the operation and/or performance of each evaluative element within the requirement statement. Determine the percentage of evaluative elements addressed by the organization’s operational and/or independent measure(s) or metric(s) as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric. Determine if the measurements include independent and/or operational measure(s) or metric(s) as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric. Example test(s):
- For example, measures indicate if the organization verifies the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI models, software packages (e.g., those for model creation, training, and/or deployment), datasets (e.g., training datasets), and language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins) before use, as applicable.
- For example, measures indicate if the organization verifies the cryptographic hashes and/or digital signatures on downloaded AI models, software packages (e.g., those for model creation, training, and/or deployment), datasets (e.g., training datasets), and language model tools (e.g., agents, plugins) before use, as applicable.
- Managed: Examine evidence that a written or undocumented risk treatment process exists, as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric. Determine the frequency that the risk treatment process was applied to issues identified for each evaluative element within the requirement statement.
- Policy: Examine policies related to each evaluative element within the requirement statement. Validate the existence of a written or undocumented policy as defined in the HITRUST scoring rubric.
- Placement of this requirement in the HITRUST CSF [?]
- Assessment domain: 07 Vulnerability Management
- Control category: 10.0 – Information Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance
- Control reference: 10.m – Control of Technical Vulnerabilities
- Specific to which parts of the overall AI system? [?]
-
AI application layer:
- AI plugins and agents
- The deployed AI model
- Model engineering environment and model pipeline
- AI datasets and data pipelines
- Discussed in which authoritative AI security sources? [?]
-
- OWASP 2023 Top 10 for LLM Applications
Oct. 2023, © The OWASP Foundation- Where:
- LLM03: Training data poisoning > Prevention and mitigation strategies > Bullet #2
- LLM03: Training data poisoning > Prevention and mitigation strategies > Bullet #2
- Where:
- OWASP 2025 Top 10 for LLM Applications
2025, © The OWASP Foundation- Where:
- LLM03: Supply Chain > Prevention and Mitigation Strategies > Bullet #6
- LLM03: Supply Chain > Prevention and Mitigation Strategies > Bullet #6
- Where:
- OWASP Machine Learning Security Top 10
2023, © The OWASP Foundation- Where:
- ML06:2023 AI supply chain attacks > How to prevent > Bullet #1
- ML06:2023 AI supply chain attack > How to prevent > Bullet #6
- Where:
- OWASP AI Exchange
2024, © The OWASP Foundation
- MITRE ATLAS
2024, © The MITRE Corporation- Where:
- NIST AI 100-2 E2023: Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations
Jan. 2024, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)- Where:
- 3. Generative AI taxonomy > 3.2. AI supply chain attacks and mitigations > 3.2.2. Poisoning attacks
- 3. Generative AI taxonomy > 3.2. AI supply chain attacks and mitigations > 3.2.2. Poisoning attacks
- Where:
- Deploying AI Systems Securely: Best Practices for Deploying Secure and Resilient AI Systems
Apr 2024, National Security Agency (NSA)- Where:
- Continuously protect the AI system > Validate the AI system before and during use > Bullet 1
- Continuously protect the AI system > Validate the AI system before and during use > Bullet 2
- Where:
- OWASP 2023 Top 10 for LLM Applications
- Discussed in which commercial AI security sources? [?]
- Databricks AI Security Framework
Sept. 2024, © Databricks- Where:
- DASF 10: Version data
- DASF 11: Capture and view data lineage
- DASF 22: Build models with all representative, accurate and relevant data sources to minimize third-party dependencies for models and data where possible
- DASF 27: Pretrain a large language model (LLM) on your own IP
- DASF 53: Third-party library control
- DASF 42: Data-centric MLOps and LLMOps promote models as code using CI/CD.
- Where:
- Snowflake AI Security Framework
2024, © Snowflake Inc.- Where:
- Model poisoning > Mitigations > Bullet 1
- Self-hosted OSS LLMs Security > Mitigations > Cryptographic signing
- Where:
- Databricks AI Security Framework
- Control functions against which AI security threats? [?]
-
- Control function: Preventative
- Additional information
-
- Q: When will this requirement included in an assessment? [?]
- This requirement will always be added to HITRUST assessments which include the
Security for AI systems
regulatory factor. - No other assessment tailoring factors affect this requirement.
- This requirement will always be added to HITRUST assessments which include the
- Q: Will this requirement be externally inheritable? [?] [?]
- Yes, fully. This requirement may be the sole responsibility of the AI platform provider and/or model creator. Or, depending on the AI system’s architecture, only evaluative elements that are the sole responsibility of the AI platform provider and/or model creator apply.
- Yes, fully. This requirement may be the sole responsibility of the AI platform provider and/or model creator. Or, depending on the AI system’s architecture, only evaluative elements that are the sole responsibility of the AI platform provider and/or model creator apply.
- Q: When will this requirement included in an assessment? [?]